“You will certainly not be short of advice, among the more polite will be the pensions industry, but remember they have deep vested interests and cream off too much from people’s pensions,’ said Wicks [to the incoming Pension Minister]. ‘Not so polite is that so-called pensions movement who only represent a small, militant minority and not the poorest.’
It is quite clear that only pension guarantee is change. As the principle of a tax deferred vehicle is currently destroyed by the double tax proposal for higher earners is it clear there are not so much untouchable principles but reform does not have to be logical or rational let alone economically consistent. There is also the not quite so minor issue that neither state pension, public pensions nor corporate pensions look affordable on their historic models.
The lack of trust of the “pensions industry” is a significant worry. Not that the comment that it’s expensive is particular unfair, if somewhat pejoratively expressed but consider some of the root causes:
- Complexity: complexity is expensive. The complexity of our pension system is mind-blowing: and the only question is whether corporate or personal pensions are more idiosyncratic and complex.
- Regulated excesses and enhancements: for corporate schemes regulations and enforced enhancements have added at least 50% to costs and efforts. Whilst accountancy is often blamed, and certainly has not helped, in practice it has only shone a spotlight on the unsustainability of the current approaches.
- Fragmentation, tyranny of choice and lack of compulsion: Many of the difficulties of cost arise from issues around small account sizes, providing too much optionality and choice. If pensions where compulsory with no choice of vehicle options, deducted as part of PAYE: then they would be much cheaper.
- Aiming for low contributions and thus desire to gain excess returns through investment: making money from investments is an expense business. The alternative is to pay more contributions and accept simplest minimum return solutions. When they do these sums, most take the Faustian bargain of paying and seek excess returns.
This is not exhaustive but strikes me as some of the key causes. If we are to make a better value system, with lower costs, then it has to improve these aspects or believe that the complexity / cost is worthwhile.
Given the talk of radical reform, let’s start at the beginning with the ultra-basics: what is the purpose of saving for pensions ? Should the saving be incentivised? Should this incentivisation be available to all ?
The simple rationale for pensions is to smooth consumption from working life to allow work-free period before death. Socially it is probably beneficial to smooth wealth across people’s life rather than have step changes, certainly to reduce potential dependency in old age and arguably to focus work on the more productive years of life
Incentivisation would not be required if such saving was compulsory but will clearly increase saving if voluntarily. Whilst compulsion looks simplest, many would state a society where incentivisation encouraged everyone to do the right thing would be far preferable to a society was forced to do the right thing. Compulsion could be equated to a tax : whether or not this tax had special properties.
Incentivisation for all ? Economically certainly this would not be required. The richest are likely to have both a strong aversion to future poverty and to have current income to afford to defer consumption : the degree of incentivisation required is likely to fall quite rapidly with income. However, this may conflict with broader notions of fairness, engagement and collectivism.
If we are agreed, pension saving is good, a modestly incentivised voluntary system preferable then I believe fairness would require incentivisation and access for all. Indeed, I think excluding the higher paid, may be negative at may levels. If the higher paid stop having pensions, then pensions may be seen as “second class” and reduce take up. Furthermore, modestly incentised pensions may provide a simple route for savings – and a disincentive to pursue more aggressive tax management options : and thus accessing pension may provide more tax than restricting them.
I don’t have a magic solution for the current pension woes. The only clear answer is that from Ros Altmann: we need a pensions commission – to remove the politicing, build concenus and approach around pension future. A commission is critical to maintain a consistent approach outside of an election cycle which is way too short for such long term perspective. However, there are some urgent misconceptions to address within current regime before decisions are made:
1. “Pensions industry is polite but its main focus is greed” : Listen, it's not perfect. There are some bad incentives within the structure and that has created some bad behaviour. However, it is also full of smart people, passionate people and knowledgeable ones. Yes, it wants to keep pensions – but hopefully this is agreed. Listen to the warnings about changes: they are closest to the market. Use the industry in your favour: set out want you want to achieve and get them to measure their recommendations against this. If your solution would effectively be a natural monopoly: consider that competition may be good but likely to deliver much less value for money. A regulated oligarchy may offer both choice and similar value to a regulated monopoly.
2. Tax myths:
I. Reducing pensions tax relief for higher rate tax payers:
This is nonsense. The current pension system works off a principle of deferment not exception. From a tax basis, pensions are not taxed immediately but in retirement. “Reducing tax relief” partially taxes them initially, then taxes them again in retirement. For a 50% tax payer, then this is 30% initially, and (lets assume) 40% in retirement – a tax rate of 70%. I don’t think this is the intention – but if it is please at least say so. It doesn’t ban such tax payers from pensions but makes it clear they are not wanted.
The only true tax relief is that of the tax free lump sum. This could be considered tax relief – and would be far more rationale to “limit” the relief to higher rate tax payers on the tax-free cash.
II Inheritance tax and pension funds
Consistent with deferred tax principle, on death of the last beneficiary (ie no spouse) the residual element of drawdown pension should be taxed and this applied to the estate ( ie subject to inheritance tax). Some complain this is “double taxed” and this residual element should not be part of the inheritance tax. Well, I'm happy to be corrected but for consistency I think it should. The taxation from the drawdown is simply the first taxation of the income- and brings it into line with the other assets that form part of the estate ( and were taxed once). Inheritance tax should then be applied to the whole sum. [ In extremis, consider £100 k earnt just before retirement with death straight after. If taken as income, then it would be taxed ( say £60 K) and then be subject to inheritance tax. If put into a pension for drawdown it would be £100k. It is clear this should be both taxed first and then included as part of the estate to be equivalent tax basis to the income route. (I’ve sidestepped the issue of tax rates as fairness gets into issue of tax free lump sums and other matters …) ]
Finally, what would I include within a new pensions framework :
1. Threshold pension: The drawdown regime, should be based not to a maximum age nor complexities on levels of income taken. It should simply be based on a minimum annuity that needs to be brought. The excess can then be used as desired. It also means that drawdown will only be offered to those with larger pensions.
2. Flexible retirement age: remove laws on compulsory retirement. Use a scaling factor (for early/late retirement) to allow for drawing state pension at any age. At the current state pension age (SPA) the factor will be 1.0. However, this can naturally allow and smooth the increases already planned to SPA … and in future can continue to be adjusted smoothly for changes in longevity.
3. Higher income earners only taxed once.
4. Vast simplification of pension regimes: £50,000 annual contribution limit looks sensible if it allows for back-dating as well. And rather than all these interacting maxima and rules, why not simply a max pension of £80,000 (Approx 2/3 of current earnings cap).
5. Incentivisation of collectivism: be that of corporate schemes, industry, trade union or other affiliations. But scale is important to driving down costs.
6. Inclusion of pension planning within maths curriculum: Understanding why 15% is the right contribution level should be on every school curriculum.